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ABSTRACT
In considering why practices which stimulate incentives for private agents to exert corporate 
control  should  be  encouraged,  this  paper  highlights  criticisms  attributed  to  government 
control of banks. However the theory relating to the “helping hand” view of government is 
advanced  as  having  a  fundamental  role  in  the  regulation  and  supervision  of  banks. 
Furthermore, governments have a vital role to play in corporate responsibility and regulation 
given the fact that banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed 
to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise 
banks. Through its supervision of banks, governments also assume an important role where 
matters related to the fostering of accountability are concerned – not only because banks may 
have the power to affect firm performance, but also because some private agents are not able 
to afford internal monitoring mechanisms.
Through the Enforced Self Regulation model, the paper attempts to highlight the role played 
by  government  in  the  direct  monitoring  of  firms.  In  proposing  the  Co-operative  and 
Competitive Enforced Self Regulation model, it  attempts to draw attention to the fact that 
although such a model is based on a combination of already existing models and theories, the 
absence of effective enforcement mechanisms will restrict the maximisation potential of such 
a model.
The primary theme of the paper relates to how corporate responsibility and accountability 
could be fostered through monitoring and the involvement of governments in the regulation of 
firms. It illustrates how structures which operate in various systems, namely,  stock market 
economies and universal banking systems, function (and attempt) to address gaps which may 
arise  as  a  result  of  lack of  adequate  mechanisms  of  accountability.  Furthermore  it  draws 
attention to the impact of asymmetric information (generally and in these systems), on levels 
of monitoring procedures and how conflicts of interests which could arise between banks and 
their shareholders, or between governments and those firms being regulated by the regulator, 
could be addressed.
Key words: accountability, asymmetric information, universal banking, regulation, regulatory 
capture, government.
Co-operative  and  Competitive  Enforced  Self  Regulation:  The  Role  of 
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Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
“Optimal  governance”,  it  is  contended,  “requires  a  flexible  mix  of  competition  and  co 
operation  between  governmental  actors,  as  well  as  between  governmental  and  non 
governmental actors.”2
“Pigou’s  1938  statement  on  regulation  views  monopoly  power,  externalities  and 
informational asymmetries as creating a “constructive role” for the government to help offset 
market failures and encourage social  welfare.”3 Such a view, known as “the helping hand 
view of government”4, is contrasted with that of “the grabbing hand theory”5 which is put 
forward by those who disagree with the helping hand view of government, who argue that 
governments  do  not  frequently  implement  regulations  to  deal  with  market  failures.6 
Furthermore such a theory predicts that governments focussing more on strengthening private 
sector  control  of  financial  institutions,  namely,  banks,  are  more  likely  to  promote 
development within these institutions than governments taking a more hands-on approach to 
regulation.7 
Law enforcers are admonished to be responsive to citizens’ and /or corporations’ abilities to 
effectively  regulate  themselves  before  deciding  whether  to  increase  their  level  of 
intervention.8 Responsive regulation is not only regarded as a task which governments alone 
can undertake, but also one which private actors can perform – to the extent that they are also 
able to regulate governments responsively.9
This paper addresses how the involvement of governments, private agents (through private 
sector corporate control of banks and firms), and other actors such as standard setting bodies 
in  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  contribute  to  corporate  responsibility.  It  aims  to 
highlight not only why the Enforced Self Regulation model is preferred to government or self 
regulation, but also the benefits of the Co-operative and Competitive Self Regulatory model 
over that of the model based on Enforced Self Regulation.
1 Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP) University of Bremen, and Teaching Associate, 
Oxford Brookes University, Oxford.
2 See DC Esty and D Geradin, „Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives” 
2001 Oxford University Press at page 31
3 See JR Barth, G Caprio Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” pp 1-
2; see also AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1938) 4th Edition London: MacMillan and Co
4 „According to which governments regulate to correct market failures“. See abstract, ibid.
5 „According to which governments regulate to support political constituencies“ ibid. See also A Shleifer 
and R Vishny The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press at page 47
6 ibid
7 ibid at page 2
8 J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) at page 29 also see N Gunningham 
and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9 J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) at page 29 
In considering why practices which stimulate incentives for private agents to exert corporate 
controls (such practices being facilitated under the Enforced Self Regulation Model) should 
be  encouraged,  the paper  highlights  criticisms  attributed  to  government  control  of  banks. 
However, it also points out the fact that banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being 
principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the 
ability to supervise banks. Hence it highlights how the “helping hand” view of government 
could contribute in this respect. In so doing, it also draws attention to the fact that even though 
government control of banks has its weaknesses, a distinction should be drawn between both 
theories (the “helping hand view” of government and “the grabbing hand” theory) as a means 
of  highlighting  the  role  which  government  officials  can  assume  in  the  regulation  and 
supervision of banks.
The paper also highlights the benefits of government ownership of banks – as compared to 
government’s  mere  supervision  and  regulation  of  banks.  Such  benefits  of  government 
ownership include the “extensive control” which it provides to the government in respect of 
the choice of projects being financed whilst leaving the implementation of these projects to 
the private sector and its contribution in helping the government to rectify failures which pose 
a threat to private capital markets.10
Section One draws attention to the principal advantage which Enforced Self Regulation is 
considered to have over Self Regulation, namely accountability,  through an analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages attributed to Enforced Self Regulation and Self Regulation. In 
drawing  a  comparison  between  stock  market  economies  and  universal  banking  systems, 
section  two  not  only  highlights  how  such  systems,  through  certain structures,  serve  as 
accountability mechanisms, but also considers  the impact of banks on firm performance – 
particularly  in  universal  banking  systems.  Section  three  then  highlights  the  conflicts  of 
interest  attributable  to  asymmetric  information  and  introduces  the  concept  of  “regulatory 
capture”.  Furthermore,  it  makes  reference  to  measures  which  have  been  implemented  in 
certain jurisdictions – as means of resolving such conflicts of interest and issues related to 
asymmetric  information.  Section  four  highlights  the  benefits  attributed  to  government 
ownership of banks,  its capacity to address and rectify institutional  failures which pose a 
threat to private capital markets, and how the issue of asymmetric distribution of information 
(between  regulator  and  the  regulated)  has  impacted  jurisdictions  dominated  and  not 
dominated  by  government  ownership  of  banks.  Section  five  addresses  the  role  of  state 
regulation in assisting to prevent banks from taking excessive risks. It does this by way of 
reference to the role played by the “helping hand view of government” in combating problems 
attributed to informational asymmetries. Within this context, it highlights the fact that even 
though benefits are derived from bank independence (independence from external control), 
government ownership of banks could assume an important function where a distinction is 
drawn  between  the  “helping  hand”  and  the  “grabbing  hand”  theories.  Section  six  then 
concludes with an introduction and analysis of the Co-operative and Competitive Enforced 
Self Regulation Model – with focus on why such a model is preferred to the Enforced Self 
Regulation model.
10 See R La Porta, F Lopez de Silanes and A Shleifer, “Government Ownership of Banks” 2000 Working 
Paper 7620 at page 3
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Self Regulation
I. Advantages of Self Regulation
Some potential advantages of self regulation as identified by Coglianese and others are as 
follows:11
i) Proximity: Self regulatory organisations are considered to be closer to the industry 
being regulated.  Such proximity not only provides  them with greater  access to 
more  comprehensive  and  up-to-date  information  about  a  particular  industrial 
sector,  enables  them to spot  impending problems at  a greater  pace,  but  is  also 
helpful within the context of rapidly changing sectors. This is contrasted with the 
situation  involving  government  regulators  who  are  considered  to  often  find 
themselves in positions where they have to “catch up”.
ii) Flexibility: Given the fact that self regulatory organisations are considered not to 
face “due process hurdles” and political constraints which government regulators 
are  subjected  to,  such  conditions  accord  them with  greater  flexibility  and  the 
ability  to  address  “politically  unpopular  or  extremely  complex  issues”  which 
government regulators may be unwilling to address.
iii) Compliance: Self regulation is considered to have the potential to contribute to a 
higher  level  of  compliance  with  rules  since  the  involvement  of  industry  in 
establishing those rules facilitates greater acceptance of such rules by individual 
firms.  Another  explanation  put  forward  to  explain  why  self  regulation  may 
facilitate compliance lies in the fact that self regulation is also considered to have 
the potential to “harness the collective interests of the industry”.12
iv) Resources: Self regulatory bodies are considered to have greater potential to secure
required facilities and funding – whose availability or use cannot be determined or 
impeded by bodies such as legislature.”
II. Disadvantages of Self Regulation
Disadvantages  also  identified  by  Coglianese  and  others  and  attributed  to  self  regulation 
include:13 i)Conflicts of interest – which is attributed to “the very proximity which can help 
self regulators acquire useful information” – since knowledge of a particular industry does not 
necessarily imply that the incentives of the self regulator are projected in the right direction to 
enable  such a  regulator  regulate  more  effectively ii)  Inadequate  sanctions:  The advantage 
attributed to flexibility is also considered to have the potential to result in effective level of 
sanctions  being  imposed  on  serious  perpetrators.  iii)  Under  enforcement  and  insufficient 
monitoring  of compliance  with rules:  Such a disadvantage is  attributed  to self  regulators’ 
conflicts of interest – as well as the level of flexibility at their disposal .
11 C Coglianese, T J. Healey, E K. Keating and M L. Michael, „The Role of Government in Corporate 
Governance“ Regulatory Policy Program Center for Business and Government at page 6 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/
12 It is stated that „competitors will be able to effectively police each other’s activities.“ see ibid
13 see ibid at pages 7 and 8
Other disadvantages which could be attributed to self-regulation include: 
i) Regulatory  capture14 (which  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  under  the  second 
section of section C of the paper) – which could result from too much proximity and 
flexibility between the regulator and the industry and industries being regulated.
ii) Insufficient level of accountability
III. Advantages of Enforced Self Regulation over Self Regulation
In  terms  of  flexibility,  compliance,  enforcement  and  accountability,  the  Enforced  Self 
Regulation model is considered to confer greater benefits than self regulation.
“Enforced self regulation represents an extension and individualization of the “co-regulation.” 
theory.  Co regulation,  as  distinct  from enforced  self  regulation,  is  usually  taken  to  mean 
industry- association self regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government.”15 
i) Monitoring, Compliance and Enforcement
In proposing that “the need for innovation is at the intermediate  levels  of the pyramid of 
regulatory strategies”, Ayres and Braithwaite infer that the greatest challenge encountered by 
regulatory  design  is  probably  not  to  be  found  at  the  apex  of  the  pyramid  of  regulatory 
strategies  “where  a  variety  of  well-tested  punitive  strategies  exist”  or  at  the  base  of  the 
pyramid, “where there is experience of the successes and failures of the free market and of 
self-regulation in protecting the consumers.”16
As well as the fact that Enforced Self Regulation is considered to facilitate a process whereby 
“more  offenders  would  be  caught  often”,  “offenders  who  are  caught  are  thought  to  be 
disciplined in a larger proportion of cases under the Enforced Self Regulation Model than 
under traditional government regulation”.17
According  to  the  findings  of  a  research  undertaken  by  Barth,  Caprio  and  Levine,18 they 
conclude  that  regulatory  practices  which  “involve  direct  government  oversight  of  and 
restrictions  on  banks”,  such  practices  conforming  with  the  grabbing  hand  view than  the 
helping hand view of regulation, in their opinion, should be exercised with limitations and 
precautionary restraints.19 Instead, practices which “compel accurate information disclosures, 
empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to 
exert corporate control” are recommended – given their potential to facilitate and promote 
bank stability.20
14 The theory of regulatory capture was introduced by Richard Posner who argued that „regulation is not about 
the public interest at all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek to promote their private interest..” See R 
Posner “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science at 
pages 335-358
15 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University 
Press at page 102; Also see P Grabosky and J Braithwaite Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of  
Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, (1986)  at page 83 Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
16 ibid at page 101
17 See ibid at page 114
18 R Barth, G Caprio Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” at page 1
19 ibid
20 ibid
Ayres and Braithwaite argue that “although internal compliance groups can be expected to 
catch  more  offenders  than  government  inspectors,  they  cannot  be  counted  on  to  send 
offenders  to  courts  of  law  for  prosecution  with  the  frequency  expected  of  government 
inspectors.”21 However, in their opinion, “ reasons which suggest that enforcement under the 
Enforced Self Regulation model would not be less effective than a regime which exists under 
traditional government regulation include”:
- The  fact  that  under  enforced  self  regulation,  companies  with  strong  records  of 
disciplining their employees would be rewarded as showing up well in government audits 
of toughness of internal compliance systems;
- Existing  public  enforcement,  in  contrast,  gives  companies  incentives  to  cover  up and 
protect their guilty employees
- Internal discipline, is in many ways more potent than government prosecution because 
internal enforcers do not have to surmount the hurdle of proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
and  do  not  have  to  cut  through  a  conspiracy  of  diffused  accountability  within  the 
organisation 22
- It  would  be  easier  for  prosecutors  to  obtain  convictions  under  the  Enforced  Self 
regulation Model.23
- Compliance would become the path of least corporate resistance.”24
However, they also add that direct government monitoring would still be required where firms 
are not able to afford their own internal monitoring compliance groups.
Barth et al, are of the opinion, however, that since banks are difficult and costly to monitor, 
given the fact that private agents may not have the ability or incentive to supervise banks – 
and hence, such agents will attempt to” free-ride”, “the helping hand view” of government 
suggest an important, powerful role for government officials in regulation and supervision.25 
They are also of the view that government  officials  can mitigate  market failures resulting 
from “sub optimal performance and stability” occasioned by insufficient monitoring.26
Under  Enforced  Self  Regulation,  greater  compliance  would be fostered,  not  only because 
“rules would be tailored to match the company – hence, i) rules could be simpler and have 
greater specificity of meaning, ii) the dangers of complexity and blandness may be avoided 
when rules relate to a finite and known set of circumstances rather than to an infinite and 
unknown range of business activities, but also because companies would be more committed 
to rules they wrote.”27
21 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University 
Press at page 114
22 In this regards Ayres and Braithwaite make reference to the fact that “corporations in the past have protected 
their individual members from prosecution by presenting a confused picture of the allocation of responsibilities 
to the outside world”; see ibid 
23 see ibid at page 115
24 “Requiring compliance directors to report management refusals to heed their recommendations would put 
pressure on executives to comply with those recommendations; ibid
25 R Barth, G Caprio Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” at page 11
26 ibid
27 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford 
University Press at page 110. Furthermore, Ayres and Braithwaite add that any attempt to “pass on the buck” 
could be mitigated through joint participation of company, government, and stakeholders in a rule making 
programme. See ibid at page 113
ii) Accountability
Although  the  Enforced  Self  Regulation  model  is  considered  to  offer  greater  possibilities 
whereby corporate agents could be held accountable – than is the case under self regulation, 
there is greater scope for such a model to be optimised as will be considered under the model 
which incorporates both Enforced Self Regulation and Regulatory Competition.
iii) Flexibility
The flexibility conferred by the Enforced Self Regulation model could also help address the 
control of corporate crime since it is also contended28 that “a primary reason for the failure of 
the law to control corporate crime” stems from the fact that “legal institutions are made to 
last, whereas economic institutions are designed for rapid adaptation to changing economic 
and  technological  realities”  -  and  that  as  a  result,  “rules  would  adjust  more  quickly  to 
changing business environments”.
iv)Avoiding Duplication
Reference is also made to the fact that “government regulation of prices and profits of private 
concerns always involves a large element of waste, duplication and costs – since two sets of 
persons are concerning themselves with the same work.”29
B. The Influence of Banks on Firm Performance and Accountability  in Stock Market 
Economies, and Universal Banking Systems
“If banks improve performance with respect to their own holdings, why do they not use their 
proxy power to further improve firm performance?”30
Characteristics  attributed  to  banks,  which  to  an  extent,  are  distinguished  on  the  basis  of 
whether such banks operate or exist in stock market economies or universal banking systems 
include the fact that:31
- Banks in stock market economies are considered to assume roles which include those of 
“monitoring  managements”  – this  occurring  through the  bank acting  principally  as  a 
creditor
28 see I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford 
University Press at page 110. In this context, Ayres and Braithwaite also add that “rules would be tailored to 
match the company” and that under enforced self regulation, “rules could be both simpler and have greater 
specificity of meaning. The dangers of complexity and blandness may be avoided when rules relate to a finite 
and known set of circumstances rather than to an infinite and unknown range of business activities”; ibid.
29 See A Pigou, The Economics of Welfare Volume 1 2005 at page 379 : Alfred (not Arthur!) Pigou makes 
reference to Professor Durand’s observations in this statement.
30The response given to their question is that “firstly if banks were to use their power overtly (even for the good), 
social sanctions may be imposed on them. Secondly, bank power is limited by the ability of individuals to dictate 
to banks on how they should vote.” see G Gorton and F Schmid, „Universal Banking and the Performance of 
German Firms“ NBER Working Paper 5453 1996 at page 25.
31 Ibid at page 1
- In the case of universal banking systems, banks are authorised to “underwrite, trade, hold 
firms’ equity. Furthermore, since the capitalisation of the stock market is small, hostile 
take-overs rarely occur.”
The above distinctions  between stock market  economies,  as well as other differences32,  in 
Gorton and Schmid’s opinion, give rise to questions, one of which relates to accountability – 
namely,  “how  agency  problems  between  managers  and  shareholders  are  dealt  with  in 
Germany where there is a separation of ownership and control (given the absence of a large 
stock market). If shares are not easily traded how are managers held accountable?”33
Such concerns however, may prove to be unfounded. The universal banking system which 
operates in Germany is distinguished from the stock market economies which exist in the US 
and  the  UK,  and  with  respect  to  governance,  on  the  basis  that  there  is  less  dispersed 
ownership and higher concentration of ownership of larger firms in Germany.34 In countries 
like the UK and the US where ownership is  more dispersed,  it  is  argued that  “control is 
exerted  by  managers  with  considerable  freedom  to  pursue  their  own  interests  at  the 
shareholders’ expense” – since their actions are not monitored adequately.35 It is also argued 
that there is little incentive for individual shareholders to monitor since they are individually 
responsible for any accrued costs – even though such monitoring ultimately serves the benefit 
of all shareholders.36
Hence whilst  there are concerns related to accountability -  in respect  of agency problems 
between  managers  and  shareholders  and  given  the  absence  of  large  stock  markets,  the 
presence of less dispersed ownership and a higher concentration of ownership of large firms 
in such jurisdictions as Germany could serve to compensate as checks in holding managers of 
such firms accountable for their actions (since there will be less likelihood for such managers 
to pursue their own interests). Conversely, the presence of large stock markets in the UK and 
US could compensate for a gap in accountability mechanisms which is attributed to more 
dispersed ownership within these jurisdictions.
Other questions relate to how information is to be transmitted to German firms involved in 
decision making procedures (related to investments) in the absence of stock market prices and 
whether banks act to resolve agency problems in firms or rather serve as detrimental factors to 
the performance of firms .37
Furthermore, Xie concludes38 that “the overall effect of universal banking on firm growth is 
negative”  – with  the  suggestion  that  the  negative  effect  attributed  to  conflicts  of  interest 
dominates the positive effect attributed to economies of scale and scope of universal banking. 
32 For further differences, see ibid at page 1
33 ibid at page 2
34 See J Edwards and M Nibler, „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership 
Concentration“ 2000 Journal of Economic Policy Volume 31 at pages 237-260
35 ibid at pages 239 and 240
36 ibid
37 In this regard, they pose the fundamental question of “whether a relationship with a German bank serves 
as a substitute for a stock market.”
38 See L Xie, “Universal Banking, Conflicts of Interest and Firm Growth” 2007 at page 1: Refer to 
abstract of the paper
It  is  also  highlighted  that  “a  banking  system  dominated  by  state  owned  banks  may  be 
associated with lower firm performance.”39 
The  ability  of  commercial  banks  to  conduct  business  activities  involving  securities,  it  is 
argued, could impact firm performance in two contrasting ways, namely:40
- Economies of scope and scale in universal banking can facilitate firms’ access to credit 
and promote firm growth. In addition, economies of scale in universal banking which 
allows better risk diversification and lowers transaction costs for banks, could also result 
in higher levels of growth for the firm.
- On the other hand, a combination of commercial banking and securities business could 
also introduce the possibility of conflicts of interest, creating disincentives for firms and 
lowering firm growth.”41
 
C. Conflicts of Interest Attributed to Asymmetric Information
The above mentioned conflicts of interest, it is further argued42, could also adversely impact 
the levels of bank monitoring – given the fact that firms would expect to be bailed out during 
periods of distress and difficulties.
Having highlighted the potential of asymmetric information to facilitate conflicts of interest, 
systemic risk and market failures which are also generated as a result of such asymmetries call 
for  stronger  measures  aimed  at  facilitating  the  exchange  and  disclosure  of  information 
between  the  industry  being  regulated  and  the  regulator/s.  This  also  justifies  roles  for 
government,  private  agents  and other  actors  in  regulation  since  the  involvement  of  more 
actors  would  mitigate  possibilities  whereby excessive  concentration  of  information  in  the 
hands of a particular  actor could occur. The greater the number of actors involved in the 
regulatory process,  the greater  the possibilities  that  information  would be distributed to  a 
greater extent between parties involved. Furthermore, where more actors are involved, there 
should less scope for abuse of information , more checks to ensure that certain actors do not 
use such information for their personal or political gains, and less possibilities of “regulatory 
capture” occurring.
Regulatory Capture
The independence  of  the  regulator  from the industry which  is  being regulated  is  vital  to 
ensuring that regulatory capture does not occur. Regulatory capture is less likely to occur 
39 ibid at page 9; “Unrestricted” range of security business and “permitted” range of security business are 
distinguished in the sense that “unrestricted” is used to denote the fact that a “full range of securities activities” 
can be conducted directly in the bank (an example of this being the universal banking system which operates in 
Germany – where commercial banks are allowed to conduct a full range of securities business in-house) whilst 
“permitted” is used to refer to the fact that “a full range of securities activities can be conducted but all or some 
must be conducted in subsidiaries.” See ibid at page 16
40 L Xie, “Universal Banking, Conflicts of Interest and Firm Growth” 2007 at page 3
41 In this sense Xie uses universal banking interchangeably with the combination of commercial banking 
activities and securities businesses. See ibid at page 2. She adds that “more specifically, if banks are able to 
underwrite securities for their borrowing firms, they may have incentives to help firms issue securities by hiding 
or distorting information when firm quality has deteriorated and credit risk levels have increased.” (such 
information relating to quality deterioration and credit risk being known only to such banks).
42 Ibid at page 3
where more actors are involved in the regulatory process and is more likely to occur where 
there  is  regular  contact  between  the  regulator  and  the  regulated.43 As  well  as  being 
consequential of a lack of transparency in the supervisory regime, regulatory capture is also 
more likely to occur where a system of self regulation exists. In elaborating on the role of 
government in preventing banks from taking excessive risks, the crucial issue to be addressed 
relates to the facilitation of information disclosure.
“The economic theory of regulation as proposed by Stigler admits the possibility of “capture” 
by interest groups other than the regulated firms. Furthermore, exceptions to the general rule 
that regulatory agencies are captured by the regulated firms are explained by references to the 
personality  of  the  legislators,  public  opinion,  ignorance,  folk  wisdom etc.”44 Posner  also 
provides criticisms of both the traditional public interest theory of regulation and “the newer 
economic theory” which regards regulation as “a service supplied to effective political interest 
groups.”45
As mentioned above, the greater the number of actors involved in the regulatory process, the 
lesser  the  probabilities  of  regulatory capture  occurring.  Furthermore,  possible  conflicts  of 
interest which could occur between banks and their shareholders, between the Government 
and the firms which are being regulated by regulator would be mitigated where other actors 
which  are  independent  from  the  firms,  banks  or  the  Government,  are  involved.46 Do 
mechanisms  of  accountability  (such  as  groups  which  serve  the  interests  of  practitioners, 
consumers  etc)  prevent  regulatory capture? The answer to this  would appear to be in the 
affirmative but could also appear in the negative – dependent on how much influence such an 
accountability mechanism has on the regulator. Even though the Consumer Panel provides 
advice to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), some form of check is in place to ensure 
that it does not unduly influence the regulator by restricting its main purpose to the provision 
of advice. It does not carry out responsibilities on behalf of the FSA.
43 Characteristics of situations where regulatory capture is likely to occur include: i)” Where only one 
industry is being regulated; ii) where the regulator is part of a larger organisation; iii) where there is conflict 
between the regulator and the regulated ; iv) where regular contact occurs between the regulator and the 
regulated and/or ; v) where a regular exchange of personnel occurs between the regulator and the regulated.” See 
P Grabosky and J Braithwaite (1986) Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business  
Regulatory Agencies Oxford University Press
44 See R Posner “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science at pages 343 and 344. 
45 Ibid at page 356
46 “The Financial Services Markets Act 2000 established the Practitioner Panel as a statutory body alongside the 
Consumer Panel and the Financial Services Consumer Panel advises the FSA on all aspects of its work – at the 
same time monitoring its effectiveness from a consumer’s perspective”. See “ The Financial Services 
Practitioner Panel : Statutory Role” http://www.fs-pp.org.uk/stat_role.htm and “The Financial Services 
Consumer Panel: An Independent Voice for Consumers of Financial Services” (Annual Report 2004/2005) at 
page 1
“With regards to public accountability, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is obliged to maintain 
arrangements for consultation with consumers and practitioners. There were concerns that the independence of 
the Practitioner and Consumer panels would be compromised since they were established by the FSA – however 
statutory roles were given to both panels. Section 11 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 brought an 
important part of formal accountability of the FSA to the Panel into effect. The FSA is required to consult both 
panels about how far its general policies and practices conform to its statutory duties – such a statutory 
obligation also embracing its regulatory objectives and principles.” For further information on this see C 
Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England 1995 at page 404 (Lloyds of London Press) and M 
Ojo, “The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability” Global Journal of Business 
Research (2007) Volume 1No 1 at pages 83 - 96
D. Government Ownership of Banks
Two proposed views of governments’ involvement in financial markets are as follows:47 the 
first,  referred to as the “development” view, is  linked to Alexander Gerschenkron who is 
considered to have placed focal attention on the importance of financial development – as a 
means of facilitating economic growth. He argues that privately owned commercial  banks 
were  the  crucial  vehicle  of  directing  savings  to  the  industry in  several  industries  –  most 
notably, in Germany. In contrast, the second and more “current” political view of government 
ownership advanced by La Porta et al is one whereby “government control of finance, through 
its banks or otherwise, politicises resource allocation for the sake of getting votes or bribes for 
office holders.”48 This second and more pessimistic view is also considered to lower economic 
efficiency.49
Ways through which the government is considered to be involved in the financing of firms 
include:50
- Through the direct provision of subsidies 
- By  encouraging  private  banks  through  regulation  and  suasion  to  lend  to  politically 
desirable projects
Government  ownership of banks,  in  contrast  to  its  regulation  of the industry or “outright 
ownership of all projects”, it is argued, not only provides government with “extensive control 
over the choice of projects being financed whilst leaving the implementation of these projects 
to the private sector,” but also  enables it to address and rectify institutional failures which 
pose a threat to private capital markets – hence serving as a tool which such a government 
could implement in facilitating financial and economic growth.51 In Germany and France - 
where  the  financial  sector  was  dominated  by  state  ownership52,  as  globalisation  gained 
momentum , the issue of asymmetric distribution of information between the industry being 
regulated and the primary regulator was considered not to be as important53 as was the case 
with the UK, Japan and North America.
47 See R La Porta, F Lopez – de Silanes and A Shleifer “Government Ownership of Banks” 2000 Working 
Paper 7620 http://www.nber.org/papers/w7620  at page 3
48 ibid at page 4
49 ibid 
50 ibid at page 5
51 ibid
52 Based on data relating to share of the assets of the top 10 banks owned or controlled by the government 
(government ownership of banks of these countries in 1995), such data revealed that government ownership of 
banks in France amounted to 17.26% whilst that for Germany amounted to 36.36%. Based on data relating to the 
share of assets of the top 10 banks owned or controlled by the government in 1985 – using as proxy for the 
percentage of banking assets owned by the government before the privatisation in the 1960s and 1970s, such 
data revealed that government ownership of banks before privatisation in France amounted to 75% whilst that 
for Germany amounted to 36.36%. See R La Porta, F Lopez – de Silanes and A Shleifer “Government 
Ownership of Banks” 2000 Working Paper 7620 http://www.nber.org/papers/w7620  at pages 36 and 37
53 The issue of asymmetry was not as important since banks were the dominant institutions in their 
countries – due to their universal bank structure; see JR Shelton, The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 1997 
Volume 1: Sectoral Studies at page 73-74
b) Role of State  Regulation in Helping to Prevent  Banks from Taking Excessive Risks – 
Addressing Asymmetric Information
The moral  hazard rationale  for regulation is attributed to safety net  arrangements such as 
deposit insurance and lender of last resort arrangements.54 Lender of last resort arrangements 
could  have  adverse  incentive  effects  and  induce  banks  into  excessive  risk  taking  whilst 
deposit insurance protection could lead to consumers being less careful about their selection 
of banks.55 Furthermore, because of insurance, some depositors do not demand an appropriate 
risk premium in their interest rates and finally, the existence of deposit insurance may compel 
banks to hold lower levels of capital.56
Apart  from good regulatory  procedures  and  the  design  of  regulation  to  the  effect  that  it 
discourages inadequate pricing of insurance premiums (which would stimulate incentives of 
bank managers  to  take excessively undue risks),  other  ways  through which moral  hazard 
could  be  controlled  include  good corporate  governance  practices  and effective  disclosure 
requirements  under  which  banks  are  mandated  to  disclose  information  to  users  of  that 
information.
An important  means  whereby corporate  responsibility,  through banks,  could be enhanced, 
relates to measures which could be imposed to reduce excessive levels of risk taking by banks 
– as well as stimulating depositors’ incentives to monitor banks. Bonus related schemes which 
are linked to performance levels of bank’s senior management, and which will be reduced or 
refused, based on the level of negligence, recklessness or irresponsibility of such officials, 
could  be  imposed.  In  relation  to  levels  of  deposit  insurance  which  is  offered  to  their 
customers,  levels  granted  (as  well  as  being  dependent  on  the  deposited  amount),  should 
correspond with the number of years that a depositor has held an account with a bank. A 
customer who has deposited considerable huge amounts with a bank, and who has been a long 
standing customer of a bank is generally more likely to monitor such bank’s activities than a 
customer who has very little reason to. There should be no guarantee that all depositors (long 
standing  and  newly  acquired)  will  receive  the  same  and guaranteed  level  of  protection). 
Loyalty to a bank – as evidenced by, and dependent on amounts deposited, as well as the 
length of time spent as a depositor with such a bank, should be compensated monetarily since 
such depositors are considered to be taking some level of risk and should assume some form 
of responsibility in monitoring the actions of those into whose hands they’ve committed their 
deposits.
“Without regulation which gives consumers some independent assurance about the terms on 
which  their  contracts  are  offered,  quality  of  advice  received,  saving  and  investment  is 
discouraged resulting to  damaging consequences.  In  addition,  healthy competition  will  be 
fostered through consumer education and disclosures of information on charges and other 
important characteristics of financial products.”57
Greater disclosure of information would not only facilitate monitoring and compliance, but 
would  also  help  mitigate  informational  asymmetries  which  exist  between  a  bank’s 
management  and  its  investors.  In  highlighting  the  role  of  the  “helping  hand  view”  of 
54 See D Llewellyn, “The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation” (FSA London Occasional Paper 
1 April 1999) at page 29
55 ibid
56 ibid
57 See speech by Howard Davies, former chairman of the Financial Services Authority „Building 
the FSA – Progress to Date and Priorities Ahead.“
government,  Barth et  al  argue that government  supervision has the potential  to perform a 
“socially efficient role” since informational asymmetries is considered by some to be a reason 
why banks are susceptible to “contagious and socially costly bank runs.”58
E. Bank Independence from External Control versus Government Ownership of Banks 
Several arguments have been put forward for and against the independence of banks from 
external  control.  Whilst  critics  of the universal  banking system regard a  concentration  of 
power in  banks  as  detrimental  (given  the  potential  conflicts  of  interest  which  may occur 
where bank “is simultaneously an important large equity holder in the firm, in control of a 
large number of proxy votes, controls access to external capital markets, and has outstanding 
loans to the firm”) – such concentration of power facilitating the ability of the bank to run 
firms for their personal gains and interests,59 arguments in support of German banks “as a 
model of active shareholders which should be emulated in stock market based economies” do 
not  only suggest that  the universal  banking system provides a system whereby banks are 
“active, large investors which improve the performance of firms to the extent that they hold 
equity and have proxy voting power”, but that banks in such systems are considered to be 
“long –term investors who oversee firm investments and organize internal capital markets.”
Different views are also held in relation to government ownership of banks. With particular 
reference to the impact of government ownership of banks on financial development (as well 
as  the  stability  of  the  financial  system),  “whilst  the  helping  hand  view  argues  that  i) 
government ownership of banks fosters the mobilization of savings and the allocation of those 
savings  towards  strategic  projects  with  long  term  benefits  on  the  economy;  ii)  that 
governments have adequate information and sufficient incentives to ensure socially desirable 
investments; and ii) that consequently government ownership of banks helps economies to 
overcome private capital market failure”,
the  grabbing  hand view argues  that  i)  “governments  do  not  have  sufficient  incentives  to 
ensure socially desirable investments; ii) whilst government ownership of banks may facilitate 
the  financing  of  politically  attractive  projects,  that  such  projects  may  not  necessarily  be 
economically efficient.”60 
Drawing back on Dowd’s criticism that market failures related to information asymmetry are not 
really  genuine given  the  fact  that  they are  founded on  governments’  failures  (moral  hazard 
created by regulatory authorities themselves)61, and the need for government to price deposit 
insurance  premiums  adequately,  such  inadequacies  in  government  regulation  and  the 
inadequacies also attributed to private regulation add weight to Ayres and Braithwaite’s idea 
of “the need to transcend the intellectual stalemate between those who favour state regulation 
of business and those who advocate deregulation.”62 
58 R Barth, G Caprio Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” at page 11
59 G Gorton and F Schmid, „Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms“ NBER Working 
Paper 5453 1996 at page 2
60 R Barth, G Caprio Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” at page 14
61 K Dowd, “Does Asymmetric Information Justify Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation?” Cato Journal
Volume 19 No 1 1999 at page 40; see also D Miles, ‘‘Optimal Regulation of Deposit Taking Financial 
Intermediaries’’ (1995) European Economic Review 39: 1365–84.
62 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University 
Press at page 3; “The basic idea of responsive regulation being that governments should be responsive to the 
conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed.” See 
J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (2002) at page 29
F. Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation
A  combination  of  the  Enforced  Self  Regulation  model  and  a  model  which  incorporates 
regulatory competition into Basel II (meta regulation), that is, a combination of the Enforced 
Self Regulation model and the regulation of self regulation (which incorporates attributes of 
regulatory competition), - such a model being referred to as  Cooperative and Competitive63 
Enforced Self Regulation, will be considered under this section.
In  comparing  and  contrasting  advantages  and  disadvantages  associated  with  regulatory 
competition  to  those  associated  with  Enforced  Self  Regulation  and  how  these  could 
complement each other to address disadvantages attributed to self regulation, it will also be 
illustrated under this section, that a model based on Co-operative and Competitive Enforced 
Self Regulation not only offers greater flexibility, but also more accountability mechanisms 
which would facilitate compliance.
I. Advantages of Regulatory Competition
a) Accountability
Whilst the firm is subject to mandatory regulations under the Enforced Self Regulation model, 
it  is  also  subjected  to  a  second level  of  regulation  under  Basel  II  –  which  serves  as  an 
additional check on the self regulatory processes undertaken by the firm.
Such a model is represented diagrammatically below:
Basel Committee----- Meta Regulation -- State ---  Enforced Self Regulation -- 
Firm
Other  actors  involved  in  the  model  could  include  trade  associations  and  bodies  which 
represent industry and consumer interests, and non governmental organisations. As illustrated 
with the Practitioner and Consumer Panels under section C of this paper, the involvement of 
these actors would not only serve as accountability mechanisms, but also have the potential to 
mitigate situations where asymmetric distribution of information could occur. It could also 
reduce  the  likelihood  of  a  “capture”  occurring  –  given  that  the  regulator  is  not  overly 
influenced by these accountability mechanisms and “checks”.
Enforced Self Regulation ( in the form of binding regulations) is required – not only because 
the Basel Committee is in need of stronger enforcement mechanisms, but because the “race to 
bottom effects” attributed to unfettered regulatory competition needs to be addressed.
63 A combination of co operation and competition rather than mere competition is preferred for reasons which 
will be discussed in greater detail under the last but one section of this paper (that is, under section titled “Does 
Regulatory Competition Always Generate “Race to the Bottom” Effects ?”). Such a combination provides 
greater maximisation potential for regulatory competition as it mitigates possibilities of “race to the bottom” 
effects.
b. Binding Regulations Contrasted with Regulations Under Regulatory Competition
Greater Flexibility Attributed to Regulatory Competition
Whilst some apparent advantages are associated with binding and mandatory regulations, the 
disadvantage inherent in mandatory regulation – when compared with the form of regulation 
synonymous with regulatory competition, is namely, the fact that mandatory regulation does 
not provide the choice of legal  regimes which is  offered to market  participants under the 
theory of regulatory competition. It is contended that  mandatory regulation, by compelling 
market participants to comply with a legal regime, generates “sub-optimal” benefits whilst the 
availability of choice accorded to the theory of regulatory competition, provides the potential 
to facilitate optimal regulation.64
Regulatory competition also offers flexibility in facilitating the modification of regulations - 
which not only helps in “optimally matching the interests of those that bear the cost and incur 
the benefit of regulation,” but also helps regulators in facilitating more superior regulation.65
II. Other Advantages Attributed to Regulatory Competition
As well as providing an apparent benefit over a single regulator – given the fact that it aligns 
(with greater accuracy), the incentives of regulators and issuers with perspectives of investors 
(thereby  facilitating  greater  likelihood  of  generating  rules  which  are  preferred  by 
investors),66other benefits attributed to the theory of regulatory competition include: 
i)Regulatory competition permits the creation of a single market without requiring member 
states to give up their regulatory power.67
ii)Regulatory competition is also considered to facilitate experimentation which fosters the 
innovation of policies – owing to the fact that cross border activities and the setting up of 
firms across national boundaries triggers regulators’ incentives to modify their regimes.68
64 EJ Pan, „Harmonization of U.S – E.U Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities 
Regulator”. Law and Policy in International Business at page 3 FindArticles.com 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3791/is_200301/ai_n9192864/
65 EJ Pan, „Harmonization of U.S – E.U Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities 
Regulator”. Law and Policy in International Business at page 3
66 See R Romano, “Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance ?” March 2005 
ECGI Law Working Paper Series Working Paper No 26/2005 at page 9. Such a benefit, it is contended, draws 
from the fact that “issuers will be attracted to a regime preferred by investors in order to lower their cost of 
capital.”
67 EJ Pan, „Harmonization of U.S – E.U Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities 
Regulator”. Law and Policy in International Business at page 3
68 R Romano, “Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance ?” March 2005 
ECGI Law Working Paper Series Working Paper No 26/2005 at page 10. Such incentives, which are considered 
to be triggered as a result of the regulator’s desire “to attract and retain firms within their jurisdictions, may be 
financial.” ;ibid 
III. Principal Disadvantage Attributed to Regulatory Competition
The most compelling disadvantage associated with regulatory competition is attributed to its 
contribution  to  “downward  pressures  on  regulation”.69 The  “race  to  the  bottom”  effect 
generated  by  regulatory  competition  ,  whereby  the  “level  of  protection  for  shareholders, 
employees, customers and the general public is progressively lowered”, is associated with the 
“Delaware  effect”-  a  “deregulatory  dynamic.”70 Such  unfettered  regulatory  competition, 
whereby regulators , in competing for their interests, minimise rules to such an extent that the 
resulting outcome and benefits generated by such rules are minimal than required, constitutes 
a  reason  for  the  preference  for  “regulatory  co-optition”.71 “Optimal  governance”,  it  is 
contended, “requires a flexible mix of competition and co operation between governmental 
actors, as well as between governmental and non governmental actors.”72
IV. Does Regulatory Competition Always Generate “Race to the Bottom” Effects ?
In contrast to the criticism attributed to regulatory competition’s “race to the bottom” effects, 
reference has been made to the fact that “regulatory competition does not necessarily result in 
downward  pressures  on  regulation  but  may  sometimes  also  push  the  level  of  regulation 
upwards.”73Furthermore, Genschel and Plümper argue that upward pressure on regulation may 
not  only  result  from  competitive  dynamics,  but  could  also  be  triggered  as  a  result  of 
international  co  operation.  In  their  paper74,  they  investigate  whether  the  effects  of  the 
deregulatory  spiral  which  is  attributed  to  regulatory  competition  could  be  successfully 
mitigated or eliminated as a result of the collective action of competing states (who are able to 
stop such competition as a result of a successful “co-operative turnaround”).
Their investigation focuses on the harmonization of capital adequacy requirements, through 
Basel II, which in their view, illustrates the fact that “multilateral co-operation among nation 
states can stop a deregulatory spiral  and turn it  around to a race to the top.”75 They also 
69 See P Genschel and T Plümper, „Regulatory Competition and International Co operation“ December 1997 
Journal of European Public Policy Volume 4 No 4 at page 626
70 see ibid .In illustrating this deregulatory process, an example is provided with corporate chartering in the U.S – 
where such chartering was granted by the individual states. Since all states were required to recognise each 
other’s charters, competition occurred between states who were striving to acquire corporations through the 
provision of “corporation friendly chartering requirements.” Such a process is known to contribute to a lowering 
of the level of protection for shareholders, employees, customers and the general public; ibid
71 EJ Pan, „Harmonization of U.S – E.U Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities 
Regulator”. Law and Policy in International Business at page 4
72 See DC Esty and D Geradin, „Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives” 
2001 Oxford University Press at page 31
73 See P Genschel and T Plümper, „Regulatory Competition and International Co operation“ December 1997 
Journal of European Public Policy Volume 4 No 4 at page 627. In this respect, reference is made by Genschel 
and Plümper to Vogel illustrations from his book: see D Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental  
Regulation in a Global Economy, (1995) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
74 See ibid
75 ibid; Their first case study highlighted why co operation was self stimulating whilst the second highlighted 
why co operation was self limiting.; see ibid at page 639. In drawing similarities between both cases, namely the 
fact that both dealt with a collective action problem, an extension of the range of co-operators was proposed as a 
means of resolving the problem of collective action: “as more and more actors join the co-operation, there are 
fewer and fewer actors left who could potentially free ride.” See ibid at page 634.  Also see L Martin “The 
Rational State Choice of Multi lateralism” in John Gerard Ruggie (ed) Multi lateralism Matters: The Theory and 
Praxis of an Institutional Form (1993) New York: Columbia University Press at pages 98-100. As a means of 
resolving problems associated with interest heterogeneity, a contrasting proposal is put forward by Genschel and 
Plümper who state that it is useful to limit the range of co-operators. Furthermore, the search for a balance 
highlight the fact that strict rules should not necessarily infer consequences of competitive 
disadvantage and that “competitive dynamics”, as well as international co-operation, could 
also  trigger  a  process  whereby  foreign  governments  react  by  raising  their  own  level  of 
regulation – hence starting a regulatory race to the top.76
Whilst Basel II’s ability to facilitate a situation whereby governments are induced to raise 
their level of regulation is doubtful, given its relatively weak enforcement mechanisms, its 
capacity  to  facilitate  multi  lateral  co operation  – hence  deterring  a  deregulatory spiral,  is 
acknowledged. 
G. Conclusion
As mentioned in a previous paper77, justification for greater enforcement with Basel II (than is 
presently the case), arises from the fact that whilst state imposed rules (as exemplified under 
the Enforced Self Regulation model) are obligatory, Basel II rules are persuasive by nature. If 
the Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation model  is  to realise maximum 
benefits, the Basel Committee will require greater powers of enforcement. Although Basel II 
and regulatory competition both facilitate market based regulation and harmonisation, once a 
state  has opted to be bound by rules under  Basel,  such rules should be enforced in their 
entirety.
Whilst  direct  government  monitoring  may sometimes  be required where certain  firms  are 
unable to afford their own internal monitoring devices, such direct government oversight may 
require caution since practices which involve direct government oversight are also considered 
(by some) to conform with the “grabbing hand” theory.  Practices which facilitate accurate 
information disclosures are primarily recommended.
The Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation model would facilitate greater 
accountability,  corporate  responsibility,  flexibility,  disclosure  and  innovation  than  self 
regulation  or  the model  based on Enforced  Self  Regulation.  Furthermore,  it  would  foster 
harmonisation between countries, as well as mitigate the effects attributed to a “race to the 
bottom” – hence generating possibilities of a regulatory “race to the top”.
The  involvement  of  actors  such  as  governments,  private  actors,  trade  associations,  non 
governmental  organisations and other interest  groups in the regulatory process could have 
consequences  which may be beneficial  or  detrimental  –  depending on the  interests  being 
pursued,  the effectiveness  of accountability mechanisms in the regulatory process and the 
number and mix of actors involved. As stated in the introductory paragraph of the paper, a 
combination  and  flexible  mix  of  co-operation  and  competition  between  various  actors 
between inclusiveness and exclusiveness is suggested as a way of resolving both problems at once (the problems 
attributed to collective action and the interest homogeneity). See P Genschel and T Plümper, „Regulatory 
Competition and International Co operation“ December 1997 Journal of European Public Policy at page 635. 
Also see P Genschel and T Plümper, “Wenn Reden Silber und Handeln Gold ist: Kooperation und 
Kommunikation in der internationalen Bankenregulierung” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3:225-253 
and R O Keohane, „Multi lateralism: An Agenda For Research“ International Journal Volume 45 No 4 at pages 
731 - 764
76 P Genschel and T Plümper, „Regulatory Competition and International Co operation“ December 1997 Journal 
of European Public Policy Volume 4 No 4 at page 627; With their second case study, Genschel and Plümper 
illustrate the failure of the European Community (EC) “to counter tax competition by agreeing on a common 
withholding tax on interest  payments” and in so doing , ideas as to when cooperative turnarounds are likely to 
fail. 
77  See M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives” 
February 2010
provides essential ingredients to achieving an optimal system of governance. It would also be 
added that  such an optimal  mix  also requires  effective  mechanisms  of accountability  and 
enforcement.
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